Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning
Kahneman, D. & Frederick, S. · 2002
別名: System 1 and System 2 · Cognitive reflection paradigm · CRT framework
Dual-process theory describes reasoning as the interaction of two modes of thought. Type 1 processing is fast, automatic, high-capacity and requires no working memory; it produces an answer that feels obvious. Type 2 processing is slow, deliberate, capacity-limited and depends on working memory; it can monitor and override Type 1 output but is effortful and often not engaged. The theory's most testable prediction concerns conflict problems, where the intuitive answer is wrong: performance then depends not on intelligence alone but on whether the reasoner detects the conflict and is disposed to intervene.
Framework describing reasoning as the interaction of two modes: a fast, automatic process that proposes an answer, and a slow, deliberate process that either checks the proposal or waves it through. Frederick (2005) made the second one measurable with problems engineered so that the intuitive answer is confidently wrong, so a correct response requires noticing the pull, distrusting it and verifying. The disposition this measures, cognitive reflection, correlates with cognitive ability without being it: the items demand almost no arithmetic and no knowledge, and errors cluster on the planted answer rather than spreading at random. The paradigm's own central threat to validity is prior exposure — the classic items became so famous that by 2016 roughly half of online respondents had already seen them.
- 出典:
- Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25-42. Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test. Thinking & Reasoning, 20(2), 147-168.
- デジタルオブジェクト識別子 — ジャーナル記事への直接リンク。:
- 10.1257/089533005775196732
この理論に基づいて構築された検証済みテストを受ける
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エビデンス概要
- 実証的サポート
- 中程度のエビデンス
- 再現性
- 部分的に再現
- 異文化
- ほぼ普遍的
- メタ分析
- 9件索引済み
これらの評価は、理論に関する公開文献を要約したもので、それに基づいて構築された個々のテストの品質ではありません。以下に記載された出典に基づく編集判断であり、エビデンスが蓄積されるにつれて変化します。
歴史的背景
Two-system accounts appeared across several literatures in the 1970s and 1980s — Wason and Evans on reasoning, Schneider and Shiffrin on automaticity, Chaiken and Petty on persuasion — before Stanovich and West named them System 1 and System 2 in 2000 and Kahneman popularised the framing in Thinking, Fast and Slow in 2011. Frederick's 2005 Cognitive Reflection Test gave the field a three-item instrument that produced large effects, which accelerated research enormously and also, later, created problems as the items became known to participants.
構成概念
認知的内省
The disposition to notice an intuitive answer, distrust it, and check it before committing (Frederick, 2005). It is measured with problems engineered so that the wrong answer feels finished, which is why the arithmetic is deliberately light: the difficulty sits in suppressing the first response, not in producing it. The construct correlates with measures of cognitive ability without being one — it is a habit of verification, and the ordinary human result is that the planted answer usually wins.
機器
- NOESIS Cognitive Reflection ScaleNOESIS2026
この理論に基づくテスト
実践的応用
The framework underpins behavioural-economics interventions built on the premise that choice architecture works by influencing Type 1 responses, and informs debiasing training in medicine, finance and forensic decision-making. Cognitive reflection predicts susceptibility to misinformation and to fake news headlines, superstitious belief and some financial errors, over and above intelligence. Read for self-knowledge, its useful content is not a score but the demonstration that a confident, immediate answer is not evidence of a correct one.
測定方法
Assessed with conflict problems whose intuitive answer is incorrect, scored on the number of correct rather than lured responses; validity depends on item unfamiliarity, so item exposure degrades the measure.
批評と制限事項
Evans and Stanovich themselves have argued that the popular System 1 / System 2 framing reifies into two homogeneous agents what is better described as a set of processing features that vary continuously. The Cognitive Reflection Test has serious practical problems: only three items, high familiarity among online participant pools, substantial correlation with numeracy and general intelligence, and a documented sex difference, all of which cast doubt on how much of its predictive power is specific to reflection. Whether deliberation actually corrects intuition, or merely rationalises it, remains disputed.
主要文献
- Kahneman, D. & Frederick, S.. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
- Frederick, S.. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. 10.1257/089533005775196732
- Evans, J. St. B. T. & Stanovich, K. E.. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. 10.1177/1745691612460685